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WRONGFUL DEATH: ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHT
TO POTENTIAL PROCEEDS
Wrongful death statutes generally create a cause of action in the
personal representative of a decedent for the exclusive benefit of
persons designated by such statutes as beneficiaries.' Courts have reached conflicting results when a beneficiary of a wrongful death action has
2
attempted to assign his right to the potential proceeds of the action.
3
In the recent case of Totten v. Parker, a gasoline solution, used
in the cleaning of a service station, exploded causing the death of
two boys. The explosion was apparently caused by the ignition of
the fumes by the pilot light of a hot-water heater. An action was commenced by the personal representatives of the children under the
Kentucky Wrongful Death Statute4 against the lessor of the service
station, his tenant, and the water-heater installer to recover damages
for their alleged negligence. The respective parents, who were the
statutory beneficiaries, assigned "any interest" they had in their sons'
estates to the siblings of the decedents. The purpose of assigning
"any proceeds" to which the parents might have been entitled was
to circumvent a defense of contributory negligence. 5
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the trial court's decision
in holding the assignments to be invalid. The court reasoned that the
test for determining whether the beneficiaries could assign their rights
of action was whether the beneficiaries had rights of action which
E.g.,

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Baldwin 1964) provides:
An action for wrongful death must be brought in the name of the
personal representative of the deseased person, but shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and other next of
kin of decedent....
2
Some courts have allowed an assignment of proceeds. In re Burnstine, 131
F. 828 (E.D. Mich. i9o3); Anderson v. Anderson, 12 Ga. App. 7o6, 78 S.E. 271
(1913); In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950). Contra, Sanders'
Adm'x v. Louisville & N.R.R., iii F. 708 (6th Cir. 19o0); Wilcox v. Bierd, 33o
Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
3428 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1968).
'KY. REv. STAT. § 411.130(1) (1963) provides that:
Whenever the death of a person results from an injury inflicted by the
negligence or wrongful act of another, damages may be recovered for the
death from the person who caused it, or whose agent or servant caused
it. If the act was willful or the negligence gross, punitive damages may be
recovered. The action shall be prosecuted by the personal representative
of the deceased.
5Contributory negligence, if proven, would have barred the parents from
recovery. Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130(1) (1963). The alleged contributory negligence
was permitting the children to be employed in violation of the Child Labor Act.
It was held, however, that there was no contributory negligence. 428 S.W.2d at 237.
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would survive them should they die. It then determined that while
any recovery the beneficiaries might receive would become part of
their estates should they die, the beneficiaries did not have "rights
of action" which would survive them if they died. It should be noted,
however, that the exact terminology of the assignment discloses that
it was not an assignment of a cause of action but was an assignment
of the right to the proceeds from a potential recovery. 6
At common law it was impossible for a beneficiary to assign his
right to the potential proceeds from any action as courts originally
7
refused to recognize assignments of contingent interests of any kind.
Later, however, courts of equity became more liberal and began
allowing assignments of mere future possibilities.8 Consequently,
judges presiding in courts of law agreed to uphold assignments of
contingent interests which at the time of the assignment possessed a
potential realization. 9 Under this rationale, it has been argued that
0428
S.W.2d at 237.
7
See Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant,

129 Minn. 223, 152 N.W. 265, 266 (1915).
See also Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial Security: Present and Future
Intangibles, 67 YALE L. J. 847 (1958).
"Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 152 N.W. 265 (1915). See
e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 15o F. 510 (6th Cir. 19o7) (anticipated interests
in real and personal property); Dyblie v. Dyblie, 389 Ill. 326, 59 N.E.2d 657 (1945)
(expectancy of an heir in estate of ancestor); Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y.
179, 128 N.E. 113 (192o) (future contractual interests); Mount v. Schulte, 193
Okla. 335, 143 P.2d 424 (1943) (future wages).
The theory behind allowing assignments of future possibilities is:
The existence of the cause of action gave a potential existence to the
proceeds; the potential existence of the proceeds gave an equitable existence
to the assignment.
'The fact that there was no fund then in existence, or any claim
which could then be enforced by action, did not prevent the instrument
taking effect as an equitable assignment.'
Richard v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 870, 872 (New York
Mun. Ct. 1936).
It must be noted that Richard involved a personal injury action. However,
the distinction between the effect of an assignment of a cause of action and
right to proceeds would be the same in personal injury and wrongful death
actions, in the absence of survival statutes in both cases. In both situations the
cause of action abates with the death of the assignor of the cause of action and
in both situations the right to proceeds has a separate existence. Compare Richard
v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 870 (New York Mun. Ct. 1936)
(personal injury) with Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 39, 16o
N.Y.S. 172 (1916) (wrongful death action). See also In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah
151, 213 P.2d 657, 663 (195o) where the court upheld an assignment of proceeds
in a wrongful death action, while basing its opinion on several personal injury
cases including the Richard case.
OHillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 152 N.W. 265 (1915).
An equitable assignment maintains the basic elements of an assignment at
law in that it is a transfer of some right or interest in property from one person
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assignments of proceeds in wrongful death actions be allowed.10
Furthermore, at common law, assignments of causes of action and
rights to proceeds were generally subject to the defense of maintenance
and champerty, which were directed toward the prevention of unnecessary litigation and the intermeddling in a law suit by someone
with no right or interest." Arguments against assignments which
seemed overwhelming to common law judges have today lost most of
their persuasive force. 12 Maintenance and champerty are no longer
considered as causing flooding and unnecessary litigation.13 The trend
toward legislation which provides for the survivorship of tort claims
recognize that most tort claims can be litigated between the tortfeasor
and someone other than the original plaintiff. 14 Although this recognition has been utilized to argue that even a cause of action should be
made assignable, most courts are not prepared to go that far.' 5 Some
courts, however, are prepared to permit assignments of proceeds.
Totten could have made the distinction made by some courts
between an assignment of a cause of action and an assignment of the
right to the potential proceeds of that cause of action.' The right
to the cause of action itself is generally nonassignable as it is strictly
7
a personal right which does not survive the death of the assignor.'
The difference between the personal right of the personal representative and the property right of the beneficiary is based upon the
to another. It is separate, however, because it is an executory agreement not
enforceable as an assignment by a court of law, which a court of equity may
execute according to the circumstances of the case. See Hubbard v. Bibb Brokerage
Co., 44 Ga. App. i, i6o S.E. 639 (1931); In re Purman's Estate, 358 Pa. 187, 57
A.2d 86 (1948); Banco Longoria v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 415 S.W.2d i (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967).
0
" In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 662 (1950).
"Jobanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., ioo Utah 399, 115 P.2d 794, 796 (1941).
Champerty involves a division of proceeds of litigation between the owner of
a litigated claim and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation. See Sapp
v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S.E. 62 (1933). Since champerty is a species of maintenance, it also involves an officious intermeddling in the suit. Neff v. State Bank, 33
Ill. App. 2d 53, 128 N.E. 213 (1861).
"Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., loo Utah 399, 115 P.2d 794, 796 (1941).
"Id. (by implication).
1
1d.
"See Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville & N.R.R., iii F. 708 (6th Cir. 19O1); Carson
v. Gore-Meenaw Co., 229 F. 765 (D. Conn. 1916); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571,
162 N.E. 170 (1928).
"See Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 39, 16o N.Y.S. 172
(1916); In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151; 213 P.2d 657 (195o); accord, Silinsky
v. State Wide Ins. Co., 3o App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968).
"rE.g., Rorvik v. North Pac. Lumber Co., 99 Ore. 58, 190 P. 131 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Winton, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 5o3, 66 S.W. 477 (Ct. Civ. App. 19o0);
In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950); see Bloodworth v. Jones,
191 Ga. 193, 11 S.E.2d 658 (1940).
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fact that the personal representative has the right to the cause of
action whereas the beneficiary has the right to potential proceeds
from any recovery. At first impression the distinction appears superficial, but in this situation the distinction is functional because the
beneficiary is the real party in interest and the personal representative
is merely a nominal party, necessary to prosecute the action.' s Upon
the death of the personal representative the right to the cause of
action does not survive him and pass into his estate; consequently,
the right is not assignable. 19
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the
beneficiary's right to proceeds from a potential recovery is a property
right and therefore does survive his death.20 In Van Beeck v. Sabine
Towing Co.,21 the mother-beneficiary died before judgment had been
reached in a suit involving the wrongful death of her child. The Court
viewed the cause of action as one to compensate the mother for the
pecuniary loss caused to her by the negligent killing of her child
and stated:
[We think the mother's death does not abate the suit, but that
the administrator may continue it, for the recovery of her loss
up to the moment of her death, though not for anything thereafter, the damages when collected to be paid to her estate.22
Although the cause of action in this case was based on the provisions
of the Merchant Marine Act,2 3 the Court stated that this rule is in
24
effect in many of the states in which "like" statutes are in force. It
"The personal representative acts as a trustee not for the estate but for the
sole benefit of persons designated in the statute as the next of kin of the decedent.
Fielder v. Ohio Edison Co., 158 Ohio St. 375, 1o9 N.E.2d 855 (1952).
"See Anderson v. Anderson, 12 Ga. App. 706, 78 S.E. 271 (q913). See generally,
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 § 9 (1955).
n°See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937); Williams v. Hoyt,
117 Me. 61, 1o2 A. 703 (1917).
2300 U.S. 342 (1937).
2Id. at 347. The death of one of the beneficiaries does not affect the result
of the case since the rights of the beneficiaries vest as of the time of the death,
not at the time of bringing suit or recovery. See Keenan Welding Supplies Co.
v. Bronner, 1oo Ga. App. 400, 11 S.E.2d 140 (1959); Parker v. National Zinc Co.,
406 P.2d 493 (Okla. 1965).
nrhe Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (190o).
- 1These states include New York, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, New Jersey, Georgia,
Kentucky, North Carolina, and in a somewhat different manner, the statutes of
Connecticut and Massachusetts, 300 U.S. at 347, 348. As of 1969, the statutes of
these states are still in force.
It should be noted that the reference to "like statutes" means statutes based
on Lord Campbell's Act of 1846, where a new cause of action is created in the
personal representative for the benefit of designated persons, as opposed to
survival statutes which allow the cause of action to survive the death of the
assignor. See generally W. PRossER, ToRTs § 121 at 924 (3d ed. 1964).
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was the Court's opinion that these cases were of the position that
the damages which are awarded result in property rights to the persons for whose benefit the cause of action was created. 25 When a right
is strictly personal, only one person can exercise that right. Such is
the case with the right to the cause of action which is vested in the
personal representative and therefore cannot be split or brought by
another. However, the beneficiary's right to the potential proceeds
from recovery, being a separate right, can be split and recovered by
another since this right is not a personal right but rather a property
right.26 Jurisdictions which recognize the beneficiary's right to proceeds
from potential recovery as a property right assert that it is capable
27
of assignment.
The practical effect of the separate existence of the right to a
cause of action and the right to the proceeds is significant. The danger
of common law maintenance is not present when a beneficiary makes
an assignment of proceeds as the absence of the right in the cause
of action itself precludes unnecessary intermeddling or interference
in the litigation since the right of the assignee to proceeds is not
consummated until there is in fact a recovery.
It is possible that even if the separate existence of the right of
proceeds is recognized, it may not be allowed. 28 In at least one instance
a court has acknowledged the difference between the cause of action
itself and the right to the proceeds but nevertheless refused to validate
an assignment of proceeds on the basis that, before judgment, there
was nothing which could be assigned.29 Furthermore, where the courts
fail to recognize that there is a distinction, an assignment of the
right of potential proceeds, being treated as an equivalent to the
right of action, is never allowed. 30 In one such case a wrongful death
action was brought by the personal representative of the decedent for
the exclusive benefit of the statutory beneficiaries. 31 The right to the
3oo U.S. at 348.
"In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 662 (195o).

r-See Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 39, i6o N.Y.S. 172
(1916); In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950); accord, Silinsky v.
State-Wide Ins. GO., 3o App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968) (personal injury).
See also In re Burmstine, 131 F. 828 (E.D. Mich. i9o3) (distinction not dear, however, assignment of proceeds allowed).
'Carson v. Gore-Meenan CO., 229 F. 765 (D. Conn. 1916); Goldfarb v.
Reicher, 112 N.JJ. 413, 171 A. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (personal injury).
2Carson v. Gore-Meenan CO., 229 F. 765 (D. Conn. 1916).
80Cf. Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville & N.R.R., iii F. 708 (6th Cir. 1g0); Wilcox
v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
"Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville & N.R.R., iii F. 708 (6th Cir. 19ol).

1969]

CASE COMMENTS

389

proceeds from the potential recovery was assigned by the father, who
was the only living statutory beneficiary, to the sister of the decedent
in order to create a trust for the mother, brother and sisters of decedent. The court held that the father's rights did not survive his
death and therefore the assignment was void. Because no distinction
was made, the right to the proceeds was equally vulnerable to the
survival test as the right to assign the cause of action itself, causing
assignments of all rights to be precluded.The use of the test under
these circumstances, where there were no other statutory beneficaries,
precluded any recovery notwithstanding a wrongful death. Thus it
can be argued that the result in this case discloses the desirability of
relaxing the survival test when an assignment of proceeds is made.
The recognition of a distincton between the nature of the right
to a cause of action and the nature of the right to the proceeds from
the cause of action 32 usually permits an assignment of the proceeds
33
notwithstanding a refusal to assign the right of action.
Those cases which have recognized the distinction disclose the
desirability of allowing an assignment of the right to proceeds from
34
potential recovery under certain situations. In In re Behm's Estate,
adjudicated in the Supreme Court of Utah, the husband believed
the doctor's negligence was the proximate cause of his wife's death
during childbirth. Although he was unwilling to prosecute the cause
of action, he did assign any potential recovery to his father-in-law who
financed the litigation and who in turn established a trust for the
decendent's children. After recovery, the husband unsuccessfully petitioned the court to declare the assignment invalid. The court in
allowing the assignment also noted that the assignment was not
champertous.
In wrongful death actions the parties in which the right to the
cause of action and the right to the proceeds are vested are usually
-See Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 39, 16o N.Y.S. 172
(1916); In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950); accord, Goldfarb
v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 143, 171 A. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins.
Co., 3o App. Div. 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968) (involving personal injury). See also
In re Burnstine 131 F. 828 (E.D. Mich. 19o3) (assignment of proceeds allowed, but
distinction between proceeds and cause of action was not very lucid); Anderson
v. Anderson, 12 Ga. App. 706, 78 S.E. 271 (1913).
"'See Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 3o, 16o N.Y.S. 172
(1916); In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950); accord, Richard
v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 870 (New York Mun. Ct. 1936);
Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 3o App. Div. 2d 1, 289 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1968) (involving personal injury).
31117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (195o).
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different persons. 35 In at least one jurisdiction, however, this distinction has been recognized in a personal injury case where the two
36
rights are vested in the same person.
The necessity for such recognition is realized in cases where the
injured party does not possess sufficient funds for hospitalization and
37
consequently assigns his right to any recovery to the hospital. It
has been expressly stated that such an assignment is not champertous
since the assignee has no right to interfere in the original litigation
38
and that the assignee's right can be enforced only after recovery.
In this situation if the injured party should die, giving rise to a cause
of action for wrongful death, the beneficiary might be presented with
the same need to assign his right to recovery.
It has been argued that if the proceeds were allowed to be assigned in wrongful death actions, this would lead to the assignment
of all tort claims. 39 The probability or desirability of such a result
is not within the ambit of this comment although the unique situation
in a wrongful death action, where the right to the cause of action in
the personal representative is separated from the right to proceeds
in statutory beneficiaries, would seemingly provide a logical limitation to further extension. However, the mere possibility of such a
result, even if assumed to be undesirable, is not a justifiable reason
for denying justice in cases where justice can only be attained by
permitting the assignment of proceeds. 40
The Totten case not only failed to recognize this distinction but,
paradoxically also indicated that if it had, it might be left no alternative but to allow the assignment. The court acknowledged the
survival test as the criterion of assignability and conceded that the
recovery would become a part of the beneficiary's estate upon the death
of the beneficiary. In effect, it recognized the right of the beneficiary
to the proceeds as a property right, which would withstand the court's
survival test, yet it would not recognize the right to proceeds as having a separate and distinctive existence from the cause of action.
It is possible that in some instances the underlying refusal to allow
assignments of proceeds may be founded on public policy considera'-Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 39, i6o N.Y.S. 172 (1916).
3Richard v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 824, 285 N.Y.S. 870 (New York
Mun. Ct. 1936).
MId.
8Id. at 873-4.
"'See Note, Assignment of Tort Causes of Action in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REv. 539
(1954).

"0See note 33 supra.
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tions.41 The prevalence of such consideration is sometimes noted in
cases allowing assignments of proceeds.4 2 The typical reference usually
43
states that the assignment is valid unless prohibited by public policy.
Although reference is made, the consideration apparently is seldom
used. 44 The courts, in prohibiting assignments of proceeds, do not
ordinarily mention public policy, but rather rely on either the principle that nothing can be assigned which does not exist, 45 or that
the right to proceeds is equivalent to the cause of action.46 Although
both of these principles have been cogently refuted, some courts, such
as the Totten court, still rely upon them. This would tend to indicate
that the real reason for denying the assignment of proceeds may, in
some instances, be based upon public policy considerations although
the opinions as such do not reveal this. In the Totten case itself it
is more than likely that the court was aware of the distinction between
the right to proceeds and the right to a cause of action, but because
of the fact that the purpose of the assignment was to circumvent the
defense of contributory negligence, the court may have denied the
assignment. 47 If there are public policy reasons underlying the refusal
to assign, they should be readily acknowledged. They should not be
overshadowed by judicially treating the right to proceeds on the same
basis as the right to the cause of action. Acknowledging the separate
and distinctive existence of the right to proceeds is therefore both
justifiable and essential to an equitable solution.
RONALD M. GATES

1

Such public policy considerations are sometimes based on champerty. Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., ioo Utah 399, 115 P.2d 794 (1941) (assignment allowed
because not champertous).
4'See In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 662 (195o); accord,
Richard v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 87o, 873 (New York
Mun. Ct. 1936).
"In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 662 (195o).
"See e.g., Richard v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 87o,
873 (New York Mun. Ct. 1936) where the court stated that the issue of public
policy caused the court no concern.
"S$ee Carson v. Gore-Meenan Co., 229 F. 765 (D. Conn. 1916).
"0See Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R. III F. 708 (6th Cir. 19o).
,"It should be noted that an assignment of the proceeds as opposed to the cause
of action would not have circumvented the defense of contributory negligence,
but the court may have believed that the motive of the assignment was to circumvent the defense and therefore found this reason enough to deny the assignment. Note that the court, however, found no contributory negligence. See note
5 supra.

